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HYBRITECH, INC. v. MONOCLONAL 
ANTIBODIES, INC.: ARE COURTS 
PROMOTING PROGRESS IN RAPIDLY 
EXPANDING SCIENTIFIC FIELDS? 
INTRODUCTION 
Patent protection, which stems from the Constitution, exists 
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."l Today's 
technological world is an increasingly complex place that includes 
genetically altered animals and semiconductor chips. These 
scientific products, which were undreamed of when the 
Constitution was written, make it appropriate to ask whether 
the patent laws adequately address the needs of both the public 
and inventors when the invention occurs in a rapidly expanding 
scientific field. 
Society now enjoys the fruits of the recent micro-electronic 
revolution, is in the midst of a biotechnology revolution, and 
faces, perhaps, an upcoming scientific revolution based on ceramic 
superconductors.2 Innovations arising from these rapidly expanding 
scientific areas have raised unique problems concerning 
patentability. The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTa), Congress, and courts have been called upon to resolve 
these issues. For instance, the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences recently redefined patentable subject matter to 
include nonhuman multicellular organisms that do not occur 
naturally.3 This ruling led to the April 12, 1988 issuance of a 
1. u.s. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8. 
2. See Dagani, New Class of Superconductors Disc01Jered, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING 
NEWS, Feb. I, 1988, at 5. "The world of superconductivity research is sizzling again with 
the discovery of a new class of copper oxide ceramics that carry electric currents with 
zero resistance at liquid nitrogen temperatures (77 K and above}." 
3. Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987) (finding a 
man·made polyploid oyster patentable). Prior to the 1980 United States Supreme Court 
determination that patentable subject matter included man-made micro-organisms, "living 
things" were not considered patentable. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 306 
(1980) (finding a genetically-engineered bacterium capable of digesting oil patentable). Ex 
parte Allen "reversed a long-standing PTO policy" and recognized that man-made live 
organisms, including animals, that are more complex than single-cell micro-organisms are 
patentable; this action prompted the Senate to amend the supplemental appropriations 
639 
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patent on the Harvard mouse, a rodent whose susceptibility to 
cancer is genetically engineered.4 Previously, Congress passed 
the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act after finding patent and 
copyright laws inadequate to protect the rights of inventors of 
products which were developed in the wake of the micro-electronic 
revolution.5 
A more fundamental issue, however, is whether the existing 
patent law structure is capable of addressing the intricacies 
necessary to resolve patentability issues in complex, highly 
technical scientific fields, which may themselves be in flux. This 
Comment will use a recent biotechnology patent dispute as a 
vehicle to discuss whether the patent laws adequately serve their 
constitutional purpose in rapidly expanding scientific fields.6 The 
patent dispute in Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. 7 
required the district and appellate courts to address 
technologically complex issues. This Comment assesses the 
difficulties these courts had in analyzing these issues, difficulties 
that were compounded by confusion over which patentability 
standards were applicable, and presents a possible alternative to 
the present patenting process. A discussion of general patent 
principles and a summary of the district and appellate court 
opinions in Hybritech precedes this analysis. 
bill (H.R. 1827) "to bar the PTO from expending funds during fiscal year 1987 for the 
purpose of granting patents on genetically altered or modified animals." News & Comment, 
34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 124 (1987). After the PTO voluntarily agreed 
to refrain from issuing such patents during that period, the conference committee struck 
the amendment. 133 CONGo REC. H5654 (daily ed. June 27. 1987). Following many House 
hearings, various proposals to prohibit animal patents because of religious or moral beliefs 
were defeated. Furthermore, on September 13, 1988, the House passed HR 4970, which 
recognize$ animal patents by exempting farmers "who reproduce, use, or sell patented 
animals" from infringement liability. HR 4970 also explicitly excludes human beings from 
patentable subject matter. News & Comment, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 
485 (1988). As of March 1988, 3,600 applications for bioengineered organisms were pending 
before the PTO; of these, 22 sought patentability for animals created by gene splicing. 
Washington Whispers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT. Mar. 7, 1988 at 15. 
4. &e News & Comment, 35 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 508 (1988). 
5. 17 U.S.C. SS 901-14 (Supp. V 1987). 
6. This Comment is limited to a discussion of the patent system and does not address 
in depth other intellectual property rights, such as trade secret common law rights, that 
can affect the "Progress of Science and the useful Arts." A discussion of the interaction 
between intellectual property rights and the traditional scientific ideal of full sharing of 
scientific discoveries and its effect on scientific research can be found in Eisenberg. 
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in BwtechnoUJgy Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 
(1987). 
7. 623 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1606 (1987). 
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1. BACKGROUND 
The government derives its authority to issue patents directly 
from the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power ... To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
. . . Discoveries."8 The current Patent Act, enacted in 1952, gives 
a patent owner the exclusive right to make, use, or sell inventions 
for a term of seventeen years.9 The overriding constitutional 
purpose-the advancement of science and the useful arts-has 
been interpreted by Congress to require that patent holders fully 
disclose to the public not only how their inventions work but 
also how to reproduce them.1O Thus, the development of technology 
is encouraged by giving the inventor an incentive to invent while 
providing the public, including other inventors, full disclosure of 
the latest inventions. 
Any patent, whether it be a utility,!1 plant,12 or designI3 patent, 
is granted only for a concrete application that solves a real 
problem; abstract ideas or concepts are unpatentable. I4 
Furthermore, a naturally occurring substance is not patentable, 
but "anything under the sun that is made by man" is patentable 
subject matter.I5 
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8. 
9. 35 U.S.C.A. S 154 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989). 
10. 35 U.S.C. S 112 (1982). Full disclosure takes place only when and if a patent issues; 
the PTO cannot reveal the contents of a patent application during the application's 
pendency. 35 U.S.C. S 122 (1982). 
11. A utility patent is the "normal type of patent" and encompasses products and 
processes as "distinguished from design patent[sl and plant patents." 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS 
Gl-23 (1988). Thus, "[wlhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 
U.S.C. S 101 (1982). 
12. 35 U.S.C. S 161 (1982) (protects new and distinct varieties of asexually reproducing 
plants). 
13. 35 U.S.C. S 171 (1982) (protects new and original ornamental design for articles of 
manufacture). 
14. Ideas become patentable when a "reduction to practice" occurs. Reduction to 
practice is "either actual (the building and testing of an operative embodiment) or 
constructive (the filing of a patent application with an adequate enabling disclosure}." 1 
D. CHISUM, supra note 11, at Gl-20. See also infra text accompanying note 21. 
15. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 6 (1952) (1952 Patent Act Committee reports). This language was quoted by the 
Supreme Court to support its finding that man-made micro-organisms are patentable. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). See also supra note 3 and accompanying 
text. 
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Three sections of the Patent Act enumerate the basic standards 
for patent protection. Section 101 limits patentable inventions to 
those that are "new and useful" and thus gives rise to the 
requirements of novelty and utility.I6 Although the utility standard 
usually is met by stating that the invention solves a real world 
problem, the novelty standard, which is defined in section 102,17 
is met only when no single prior device or reference discloses 
every element of the claimed invention.I8 The third standard, 
which was adopted by Congress from an earlier judicially created 
requirement,19 is the nonobviousness requirement of section 103. 
Thus, if a "person having ordinary skill in the art" deems the 
invention to be obvious at the time of invention, the invention is 
not patentable.20 
. Because a determination of novelty depends upon whether a 
prior art discloses every element of the invention, what constitutes 
prior art is a necessary determination. Although an invention 
comes into being when it is reduced to practice,21 the date of 
conception marks the time that the inventor can claim priority 
to an invention if she has been reasonably diligent in reducing 
her invention to practice.22 Thus, the time of conception marks 
16. 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1982). 
17. 35 U.S.C. S 102 (1982) (patent barred if prior art. such as previous patents or 
printed publications. enables a person skilled in the field to perform the process or 
produce the product that the inventor wishes to patent). 
18. A "reference" is any prior publication or prior patent used by the PTO to 
determine whether the invention is novel and nonobvious. 1 D. CHISUM. supra note 11. 
at GI-20. "Disclosure" refers to facts that the PTO or courts deem published by a 
reference or patent application. 
19. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850) (clay cabinet knobs that 
have same design as previously known wood knobs not patentable). 
20. Section 103 provides: 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed 
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title. if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that 
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which 
said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the 
manner in which the invention was made. 
35 U.S.C. S 103 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The hypothetical person defined in the Code 
section must have not only ordinary skill. but also an extraordinary memory because she 
knows all the relevant prior art regardless of when it was disclosed. See Ebert. Super-
person and the Prior Art. 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 657 (1985). 
21. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
22. Section 102(g) states: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ... before the applicant's 
invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who 
4
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the point when potential rights vest in the inventor.23 Presently, 
a court must determine both the conception and reduction to 
practice dates as a matter of law based on factual findings.24 
The patenting process is complicated and includes an ex parte 
examination before the PTO. Following issuance, a patent's status 
may be clarified by reexamination25 or reissuance26 hearings. PTO 
decisions denying patentability may be appealed to the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences.27 If a patent is not issued after 
an appeal to the Board, the patent applicant may appeal to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).23 
Once a patent is obtained, its validity may be challenged only in 
a federal district court through either a declaratory judgment 
action seeking a declaration of invalidity or in a defense to a 
patent infringement action claiming that the patent is invalid and 
had not abandoned. suppressed. or concealed it. In determining priority of 
invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of concep-
tion and reduction to practice of the invention. but also the reasonable 
diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice. 
from a time prior to conception by the other. 
35 U.S.C. S 102(g) (1982). 
23. The existence of a potential right at the time of conception is unusual among the 
various patent laws in the world; only the United States. Canada. and the Philippine 
Islands recognize this right. Other countries use the filing date of the patent application 
to determine when rights attach. In practical terms. a patent applicant may find that 
another's undisclosed work predates and anticipates her work. See Kayton. NQVelty 
Requirem{?11t for Patentability and Loss of Right to Patent. in 1 PATENT PRACTICE 2 (I. 
Kay ton ed. 1985). 
24. Hybritech. Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies. Inc .• 802 F.2d 1367. 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
cert. d"nied. 107 S. Ct. 1606 (1987). 
25. 35 U.S.C. S 302 (1982) (process whereby a third party can request the PTO to 
conduct another limited examination). 
26. 35 U.S.C. S 251 (1982) (process to cure defects in original patent). 
27. 35 U.S.C. S 134 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (patent applicant whose claims have been 
twice rejected may appeal the decision upon paying a fee). 
28. 28 U.S.C. SS 1292. 1295 (1982); 35 U.s.C. SS 141-44 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The 
Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals merged to create the 
CAFC on October 1. 1982. Prior to the creation of the CAFC. appeal could be made to 
the various numbered circuit courts of appeal or the now abolished Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals. In its first published opinion. the CAFC declared that precedents 
for the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decided before 
October 1. 1982. would serve as precedents for the CAFC; by implication. decisions of 
the numbered circuit courts would not serve as precedents. South Corp. v. United States. 
690 F.2d 1368. 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1982). Prior to the formation of the CAFC. there were 
significant differences concerning patent validity determinations among the numbered 
circuit courts; for example. the Eighth Circuit held invalid all patents that came to it 
from 1950 to 1970. Kayton. Nonobviousness of the NQVel Invention. in 1 PATENT PRACTICE 
19 (1. Kay ton ed. 1985). 
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therefore cannot be infringed.29 The CAFC has exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals from district court decisions determining 
patent validity.30 Final appeal from the CAFC is made to the 
United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.3! 
Because the Supreme Court rarely speaks to patent issues, the 
CAFC, for the vast majority of patent cases, has become the last 
avenue of appea1.32 However, in interpreting the Patent Act, it 
appears that the CAFC has modified some important standards 
first enunciated by the Supreme Court. 
One key area of the CAFC's divergence from the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Patent Act concerns the 
determination of obviousness.33 In Graham v. John Deere CO.,34 
the Court established this three-part test for obviousness: "the 
scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences 
between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; 
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved."35 
The results of these factual inquiries provide a framework to 
determine whether the invention is obvious. In addition, the 
Court focused on the commercial success of the innovation, a 
long-felt but unfulfilled need for the invention, and failure of 
others to succeed in producing the invention. The Court termed 
these factors "secondary considerations" that "may have 
relevancy" and "might be utilized to give light to the circumstances 
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be 
patented."36 These factors previously had been used by the Court 
to help resolve obviousness issues in close cases37 but not when 
29. Original and exclusive jurisdiction for infringement of a patent lies in the federal 
district courts. 28 U.S.C. S 1338 (1982); 35 U.S.C. S 281 (1982). 
30. 28 U.S.C. S 1295(a)(4) (1982). 
31. SUP. CT. R. 17.2. 
32. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965). "After a lapse of 15 years, 
the Court again focuses its attention on the patentability of inventions .... " !d. at 3. 
This was the first patent case heard by the Court after the passage of the 1952 Patent 
Act. 
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
34. 383 U.S. 1 (1965). 
35. Id. at 17. 
36. Id. at 17 -18. The CAFC has added to the list of secondary considerations whether 
competitors have copied the invention, whether other inventors simultaneously solved 
the problem, and whether other members of the industry were willing to license the 
invention. See, e.g., Stratofiex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 
Kay ton, supra note 28, at 17. 
37. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944). 
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the assessment of the prior art led to a firm conviction of 
invalidity.38 
Instead of evaluating the obviousness of a patent via the 
Grahmn test, supplemented by the secondary considerations, the 
CAFC has elevated secondary considerations when they are 
present to an importance equal to that of the original three 
inquiries of the Graha'in test.39 Secondary considerations, which 
the CAFC terms objective evidence, must be considered "as part 
of all the evidence, not just when the decisionmaker remains in 
doubt after reviewing the art."40 Also, secondary considerations 
are not to be used as a counterweight to a finding of obviousness 
or nonobviousness based on prior art; the prior art must be re-
evaluated in light of the objective evidence whenever this evidence 
is presented.41 
The CAFC emphasizes the critical importance of examining 
objective evidence in nonobviousness determinations. This 
approach follows Judge Learned Hand's rationale that a 
determination of nonobviousness without considering secondary 
considerations 
directs us to surmise what was the range of ingenuity of a 
person "having ordinary skill" in an "art" with which we are 
totally unfamiliar; and we do not see how such a standard 
can be applied at all except by recourse to the earlier work 
in the art, and to the general history of the means available 
at the time. To judge on our own that this or that new 
:38. See. e.g .• Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co .• :3:35 U.S. 560. 567 (1949). 
:39. See e.g .• Bausclt & Lomb. Inc. v. Barnes-HindiHydrocurve. Inc.. 796 F.2d 44:3. 446-
47 Wed. Cir. 1986) (secondary considerations constitute one of the "four inquiries mandated 
by G,·I1//Il/ll"). 
40. Strato.f7u. 71:3 F.2d at 15:38-:39. 
41. Ashland Oil. Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories. 776 F.2d 281 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
cut. df:llied. 106 S. Ct. 1201 (1986). As one commentator noted. the CAFC. in the interest 
of creating a rational system for patent law. "benignly neglect[s)" most Supreme Court 
obviousness analyses; however. the CAFC does apply "the tenets (not the holding) of 
Gmh'1111 [because they] are a model of clarity with emphasis on the proper considerations 
for § 10:3 determinations." Kay ton. supra note 28. at 16. 20. The commentator rationalizes 
this result because 
it is dear for all to see that the corllposite holdings. dicta and language 
[concerning patent standards articulated by the Supreme Court] are an 
undecipherable nightmare. In view of the extraordinarily heavy caseload 
burden the Supreme Court has been under. pronouncements about which 
are now surfacing from the Justices themselves. there is little wonder that 
a small esoteric legal. area such as patent law should have been in such 
judicial disarray. 
]d. at 16. 
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assemblage of old factors was, or was not, "obvious" is to 
substitute our ignorance for the acquaintance with the subject 
of those who were familiar with it. There are indeed some 
sign posts: e.g. how long did the need exist; how many tried 
to find the way; how long did the surrounding and accessory 
arts disclose the means; how immediately was the invention 
recognized as an answer by those who used the new variant?42 
Thus, secondary considerations can be primary evidence of the 
nonobviousness of the claimed invention.43 
A difference of opinion also exists between the Supreme Court 
and the CAFC over the application of obviousness standards to 
combination inventions. Patent claims for inventions which 
combine elements, each of which is individually old in the art, 
receive a form of strict scrutiny from the Supreme Court; the 
combination must yield unusual, surprising, or synergistic effects 
to be considered nonobvious.44 
In contrast, rather than looking for synergism to validate a 
claim, the CAFC considers whether the prior art suggests the 
desirability of the combination to one of ordinary skill in the art 
and, therefore, invalidates a claim.45 Explicitly rejecting the 
synergism test, the CAFC stated that 
[t]he reference to a "combination patent" is ... without 
support in the statute. There is no warrant for judicial clas· 
sification of patents, whether into "combination" patents and 
some other unnamed and undefined class or otherwise. Nor 
is there warrant for differing treatment or consideration of 
patents based on a judicially devised label. Reference to 
"combination" patents is, moreover, meaningless. Virtually all 
42. Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1960). 
43. But see Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Prospectives 
on In7U.nJation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 805 (1988) (arguing that heightened emphasis on secondary 
considerations unjustly rewards nontechnical achievements, including marketing decisions 
and distribution systems, instead of actual invention). 
44. See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976) (invalidating a patent 
for a water system to remove cow manure from dairy barn floors because the combination 
of elements could not "properly be characterized as synergistic"); Anderson's Black Rock 
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969) (invalidating a patent for machinery 
to lay blacktop pavement because the combination of elements did not "result in an effect 
greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately"); A. & P. Tea Co. v. 
Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950) (invalidating a patent because of the absence 
of "any unusual or surprising consequences from the unification of the elements here 
concerned"). 
45. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 
1983). 
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patents are "combination patents," if by that label one intends 
to describe patents having claims to inventions formed of a 
combination of elements.46 
647 
Thus, instead of focusing on whether a combination of old 
elements produces something unexpected, the CAFC examines 
the prior art to see if it suggests the claimed invention as a 
whole.47 The CAFC's suggestion test is far more pro-patent than 
the synergism test of the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court has not chosen to address the obviousness 
issue since the CAFC was formed. However, when it does, the 
CAFC analysis "may well turn out to be a house of cards under 
the scrutiny of the Supreme Court."48 Because an obviousness 
determination "is the most frequently dispositive patentability 
issue,"49 uncertainty in obviousness determinations has significant 
ramifications. Potential for confusion exists at the district court 
level over which patentability standards are applicable. Such 
confusion likely occurred in the case that is the focus of this 
Comment. 
II. HYBRlTECH INC. v. MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES, INC.5o 
Hybritech Inc. (Hybritech) and Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. 
(MAB) are companies that were formed in the late seventies to 
take advantage of the recent discovery of a method to produce 
large quantities of monoclonal antibodies in vitro.51 Both companies 
46. Stratoflex Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also 
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1556 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
47. See, e.g., Custom Accessories Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Ind., 807 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 
1986). 
48. Harris, Prospects for Supreme Court Review of the Federal Circuit Standards for 
Obviousness of Inrentions Combining Old Elements, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 
66, 67 (1986). 
49. !d. at 66. 
50. 623 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1985), rev'd, 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1606 (1987). 
51. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1370; Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1345. 
Monoclonal antibodies are the product of a complicated process. The immune system 
produces antibodies in response to the presence of foreign molecules (antigens). The 
molecular shape of the antibody is designed by the immune system to bind to the foreign 
molecule in its effort to render the antigen harmless. Each antibody is specific to a 
particular antigen; furthermore, an antibody can bind to only one place on the antigen, 
like a key fitting one of many locks. Not only are many different antibodies produced for 
each antigen, there are many different antigens in body fluids. Thus body fluids always 
contain a variety of different antibodies. This mixture of antibodies is termed poly clonal. 
A solution that contains only one kind of antibody is termed monoclonal. See Hybritech, 
9
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intended to use monoclonal antibodies to create fast, sensitive 
immunoassays for detecting antigens in body fluids.52 Because 
the identification and quantification of particular antigens allows 
diagnosis of various medical conditions including pregnancy, 
allergies, hepatitis, and colon cancer, both companies planned to 
market diagnostic kits using monoclonal antibodies.53 
By the time these two companies were formed, two general 
kinds of immunoassays using polyclonal antibodies were in use: 
"competitive" and "sandwich." The competitive immunoassay, in 
which the antigen to be measured competes with labeled antigen 
for a known quantity of antibody binding sites, takes considerably 
more time to produce results than a sandwich assay but requires 
only a small quantity of antibody.54 Conversely, a sandwich assay, 
in which the antigen to be measured is bound to two antibody 
molecules in sandwich form, produces results more rapidly but 
requires much larger quantities of antibodies.55 This quantity 
differential was important prior to 1975 because there was a 
limited supply of animal serum, which is the source of polyclonal 
antibodies.56 
Hybritech developed sandwich diagnostic kits and received a 
patent for its monoclonal antibody sandwich assays after its 
claims had been rejected twice by the Patent Examiner for being 
obvious.57 In the meantime, MAB had independently developed 
its own commercial kits using monoclonal antibodies in sandwich 
802 F.2d at 1368-69: Hybritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1346. 
In 1975 Georges Kohler and Cesar Milstein published their paper describing how to 
make hybridomas (fused mouse spleen cells and malignant mouse cells) produce monoclonal 
antibodies in vitro. In short. a mouse is first injected with a particular antigen. The 
antigen activates the spleen cells to produce antibodies to the antigen. The spleen cells 
are removed and fused with cancer cells that are capable of growing in a test tube. The 
resulting hybridomas are separated one per test tube and allowed to reproduce. These 
cloned hybridomas all produce the same kind of antibody (monoclonal antibodies). Kohler 
and Milstein received a Nobel Prize for their work in 1984. See Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 
1369: Hybritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1347: Fox. Antibody Reagents Revolutionizing Immunology. 
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS. Jan. 1. 1979. at 15. 
52. An antigen is either a substance foreign to the body. such as a virus. or a chemical 
produced by the body because of its condition. Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1368; Hybritech. 
623 F. Supp. at 1346. Immunoassays are "diagnostic methods for determining the presence 
or amount of antigen in body fluids . . . by employing the ability of an antibody to 
recognize and bind to an antigen." Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1369. 
53. Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1370; Hybritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1349. 
54. See Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1369; Hybritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1347. 
55. See Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1369-70; Hybritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1347-48. 
56. See Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1369. See also supra note 51. 
57. Hybritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1350. 
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assays.58 Hybritech sued MAB claiming that MAB's monoclonal 
antibody diagnostic kits for detecting pregnancy and ovulation 
infringed Hybritech's patent. MAB's defense was that Hybritech's 
patent was invalid.59 
-The District Court for the Northern District of California 
agreed with MAB and found all twenty-nine claims in Hybritech's 
patent invalid, principally for being anticipated by prior art and 
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.60 On appeal, the CAFC sharply 
criticized the district court's decision. The CAFC found all twenty-
nine claims new and nonobvious and held the patent valid, 
remanding the case for trial on the issue of infringement.61 On 
remand, the district court issued a preliminary injunction in favor 
of Hybritech and the two parties settled. MAB agreed to pay 
Hybritech two-and-a-quarter million dollars to settle the past 
infringement disputes and Hybritech agreed to grant MAB a one-
year license at a royalty rate of fifteen percent for its pregnancy 
and ovulation tests.62 The outcome of this litigation turned upon 
the validity of Hybritech's patent. Validity, in turn, entailed a 
determination of whether the patent met the novelty and 
nonobvious criteria.63 
58. ld. at 1349. 
59. See Hybl-itech, 802 F.2d at 1371. 
60. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1356-57. 
61. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1371. 
62. News & Comment, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 277 (1987). Subse· 
quently, Hybritech sued Abbott Laboratories alleging that Abbott's immunoassays in-
fringed Hybritech's patent. The Federal Circuit upheld the district court's imposition of 
a preliminary injunction against Abbott partially based upon the MAB court's finding of 
patent validity. News & Comment, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 203 (1988). 
However, to protect public interests, the preliminary injunction was not extended to the 
use of Abbott's monoclonal assays by cancer patients who were currently using Abbott's 
product. In addition, the preliminary injunction did not prohibit Abbott's production of 
nonA/nonB hepatitis test kits because Hybritech currently did not market a hepatitis kit. 
News & Comment, 34 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 349 (1987). Hybritech is 
currently involved in an interference proceeding over its patent. News & Co=ent, 36 
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 203 (1988). 
63. The district court, in addition to finding that the patent was invalid because it 
was anticipated and obvious, also found that the patent did not meet the requirements 
of section 112 of Title 35. Hyln-itech, 623 F. Supp. at 1352. 'fhis section requires the 
patent to enable "any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use" the claimed 
invention and requires the patent to "set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982). Furthermore, the patent must "conclude with one or 
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming" the invention. ld. In 
reversing on all these grounds, the CAFC referred to the district court's findings 
regarding section 112 as "utterly baseless" and hypothesized that they were included 
because the district court, as it stated at trial, wished to see that "whoever wins wins 
all the way or whoever loses loses all the way." Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1384. 
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The trial court originally found that two research groups had 
reduced the claimed invention to practice prior to either conception 
or reduction to practice by Hybritech, and thus their work 
anticipated Hybritech's invention.64 Because the court found "no 
credible evidence of conception" prior to the arrival at Hybritech 
of a scientist/executive who had experience with patents, the 
court placed the conception date just a few months before 
Hybritech filed the patent application.65 This finding, along with 
the determination that the work of two other research groups 
completely disclosed the claimed patent, led to the conclusion 
that the patent was invalid because it lacked novelty.66 
The CAFC, in reversing the district court's novelty 
determination, found the lower court clearly in error for failing 
to find credible evidence of an earlier conception date.67 The 
appellate court's evaluation was based on numerous lab book 
entries, correspondence, and testimony introduced at trial that 
dated Hybritech's conception of the invention almost a year and 
a half earlier than the date determined by the district court.66 
This earlier conception date allowed the CAFe to determine as 
a matter of law that the work of one of the research groups 
cited by the district court did not predate Hybritech's work and 
thus was not prior art.69 
In addition, the CAFC distinguished Hybritech's claimed 
invention from that of the second anticipatory reference cited by 
the district court, finding "that a mistake was made because that 
work does not meet every element of the claimed invention."70 
No single prior art was found to "read on"71 Hybritech's invention 
literally, and thus the invention was deemed noveJ.72 
64. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1351-52. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying 
text. 
65. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1354. 
66. ld. at 1356. "The said patent is invalid because it teaches nothing new in the art, 
the art alleged to be taught was obvious and logical to anyone skilled in the field." ld. 
67. Hybritech, 804 F.2d at 1376. 
68. ld. at 1376-78. 
69. ld. at 1378. 
70. ld. at 1379. 
71. To have a S 102 anticipation, 
it is not necessary that a prior art reference "teach" what the patent teaches. 
Rather, it is only necessary that the claim under attack, as construed by the 
court, "read on" something disclosed in the reference, i.e., that all limitations 
of the claim are found in the reference, or are "fully met" by it. 
1 P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 7-15 (1988) (citing Kalman v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 771-72 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
72. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1397. 
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Although the district court and the CAFC differed on the 
novelty issue, both courts recognized that (1) two different types 
of immunological assays using antibodies, competitive and 
sandwich assays, were known in the field at the time Hybritech 
conceived the claimed invention;73 (2) methods to produce both 
polyclonal and monoclonal antibodies were prior art;74 (3) poly clonal 
antibodies had been used in both competitive and sandwich 
assays;75 and (4) monoclonal antibodies had been used in 
competitive assays.76 Thus, the only combination of the two kinds 
of assays using the two kinds of antibodies which had not been 
reduced to practice was the monoclonal antibody-sandwich assay 
combination found in Hybritech's patent. 
The district court concluded that it would have been "obvious" 
and "logical" to use monoclonal antibodies in a sandwich assay 
combination.77 Furthermore, the "alleged advantages [of monoclonal 
sandwich assays] were expected as naturally flowing from the 
well-known natural characteristics of monoclonal antibodies 
compared to polyclonal antibodies."78 The court based its 
obviousness finding in part on eight scientific articles published 
prior to the patent application date that, according to the court, 
showed that the use of monoclonal antibodies in immunodiagnostic 
tests was "expected and predicted."79 
The CAFC, because it had determined an earlier date of 
invention, quickly dismissed four of the articles as not being prior 
art.SO These articles could not invalidate the patent under section 
102 because they neither described the invention prior to the 
time ascribed by the CAFC as Hybritech's invention date nor 
were published more than a year prior to Hybritech's filing date.81 
73. !d. at 1369-70; Hylrritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1347. 
74. Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1369. 1380; Hylrritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1346-47. 1352. 
75. Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1381; Hylrritech. 623 F.Supp. at 1349. 1354. 
76. Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1380-81; Hylrritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1354. 
77. Hybritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1351. 1356. 
78. !d. at 1350. 
79. ld. at 1354. 
80. Hybritech. 802 F.2d at 1380. 
81. !d. Section 102 describes unpatentability due to prior art as existing when: 
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country. or patented 
or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country. before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent. or (b) the invention was 
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country 
or in public use or on sale in this country. more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent in the United States .... 
35 U.S.C. S 102(a)-(b) (1982). 
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The CAFC applied its own obviousness test82 to evaluate the 
remaining prior art, which included the other four articles, finding 
that all references "skirt[ed] all around but [did] not as a whole 
suggest the claimed invention."83 In explicitly rejecting the four 
articles classified as prior art, the CAFC characterized the articles 
as mere discussions of the "production of monoclonal antibodies" 
and declared that "at most, these articles are invitations to try 
monoclonal antibodies in immunoassays but do not suggest how 
that end might be accomplished."84 
The courts also disagreed over the role of secondary 
considerations in the nonobviousness determination. The district 
court seemed to follow the Supreme Court's two-level analysis.!l5 
Only after concluding that the patent was obvious based on the 
scope and content of the prior art did the court consider the 
effect of objective evidence, dismissing that evidence as "icing 
on the cake."86 
The CAFC emphatically declared that a one-step analysis is 
the law;87 that is, "[o]bjective evidence such as commercial success, 
failure of others, long-felt need, and unexpected results must be 
considered before a conclusion on obviousness is reached."88 The 
CAFC found "undisputed evidence ... that Hybritech's diagnostic 
kits had a substantial market impact."89 Furthermore, the court 
found this impact resulted from the "merits of the claimed 
invention" rather than a benefit derived from either the 
availability of monoclonal antibodies or business acumen.90 The 
CAFC also found that Hybritech's kits "unexpectedly solved 
longstanding problems" because users testified that Hybritech's 
kits were more accurate than other kits, solved a false detection 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47. 
83. HyMtech, 802 F.2d at 1383. 
84. !d. at 1380. This suggestion test, particularly as used in this case, is far more pro· 
patent than that articulated by the district court. 
85. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
86. HyMtech, 802 F.2d at 1380. The district court used this phrase during the trial 
proceedings. 
87. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
88. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380. 
89. ld. at 1382. Hybritech "became the market leader with roughly twenty·five percent 
of the market at the expense of market shares of the other companies" including "industry 
giants such as Abbott Labs, Hoffman LaRoche, Becton·Dickinson, and Baxter·Travenol." 
ld. Apparently, the substantial market impact of Hybritech's kits clearly indicated to the 
court the innovation's commercial success and fulfillment of market needs. 
90. ld. The CAFC held clearly erroneous the district court's finding that the "sudden 
availability of monoclonals" caused the commercial success. 
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problem, and performed more rapidly without any loss in 
sensitivity.91 This evidence, considered simultaneously with an 
analysis of the scope and content of the prior art, the level of 
ordinary skill in the art, and the differences between the prior 
art and the claimed invention, led the CAFC to find that 
Hybritech's claimed invention was nonobvious as a matter of 
law.92 
III. DISCUSSION 
The appropriateness of the patenting process in rapidly 
expanding scientific fields must be analyzed in light of the 
constitutional purpose of the Patent Act-the advancement of 
science and the useful arts. Standards and procedures that inhibit 
inventors from inventing, encourage inventors to keep their 
inventions secret, or allow the withdrawal of inventions from the 
public domain without any corollary new disclosure to the public 
should be suspect. The patenting process in general has developed 
with the constitutional purpose as its guiding principle. Therefore, 
the pivotal question is whether highly technical and rapidly 
changing fields present unique problems which cause the patenting 
scheme to fail in its essential purpose in those fields. 
Hybritech illustrates some of the patenting problems inherent 
in inventions generated in a rapidly expanding scientific field. 
The complexity of the technical issues that a court must 
understand to decide the scope and content of the prior art and 
to distinguish the prior art from the invention is forbidding. The 
court's degree of familiarity with the scientific distinctions involved 
in the process may affect its approach to the problem. Confusion 
over the appropriate standards to determine patentability makes 
the court's job even more difficult. 
As the issues become more complex and the guidelines become 
blurred, a court may be prompted to act instinctively rather than 
to apply a principled analysis. As the costs of developing useful 
technical solutions grow, inventors and investors may be more 
wary of gambling their resources on a project when patentability, 
and thus profitability or the ability to recoup expenses, are in 
doubt.93 This result would hinder the constitutionally expressed 
policy of encouraging invention. 
91. !d. at 1382-83. 
92. !d. at 1383. 
93. Alternatively, an inventor might choose to keep the invention secret to take 
advantage of trade secret laws or forego profit for the fame of scientific publication. 
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A. Complexity of the Issues 
Although a court may not understand the technology described 
in a patent, the testimony of a person of "ordinary skill" should 
provide the court with the expertise needed to understand the 
technology. In practice, however, courts may not fully understand 
expert testimony when the subject matter is on the cutting edge 
of a new scientific field. It is possible that the concepts, the 
relationships between the concepts, and the vocabulary of the 
field may simply overwhelm the court when explained by an 
expert who has years of postgraduate training in a narrow, 
specialized field. 
There is some indication that the district court in Hybritech 
faced this problem. Most of the court's opinion was a direct 
quotation of the pretrial brief, pretrial findings of fact, and 
conclusions of law presented by MAB.94 The few paragraphs that 
the court did not quote displayed its unfamiliarity with the 
subject matter; in fact, its statement that "[m]onoclonal antibodies 
are genetically engineered cells called 'hybridomas'" is wrong.95 
Given the district court's failure to understand the basic 
terminology of the bioengineering field, it is not surprising that 
the court did not distinguish and recognize the significance of 
the evidence presented by Hybritech. The CAFC, however. 
evaluated the content of numerous Hybritech laboratory notebooks 
containing graphs and data and considered this information crucial 
in ascertaining the dates for conception and reduction to practice 
of the invention.96 The lower court was found clearly in error for 
failing to recognize this evidence.97 
94. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1371. "With the exception of the first eight paragraphs, 
the first half of the district court's opinion here is Monoclonal's pretrial brief and the 
last three pages of the opinion are Monoclonal's pretrial findings of fact and conclusions 
of law." ld. at 1374. 
95. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1345. Monoclonal antibodies are produced by hybridomas 
but are not hybridomas themselves. See Fox, supra note 51, at 15. 
96. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1376-78. Frequently the interpretation of graphs and data 
is difficult. For instance, Dr. Uotila, a scientist who uses monoclonal antibodies in her 
research, was deposed in this case. After being shown a dose-response graph of an 
experiment that she had performed earlier and whose procedure was unknown and in 
dispute, she was unable to reconstruct the procedural method even after refreshing her 
memory with her laboratory notebook. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1372. 
97. ld. at 1376. "[W]e hold clearly erroneous the district court's finding that there is 
no clear or corroborated evidence [regarding] when the claimed invention was conceived, 
and therefore reverse the court's holding, as a matter of law, that Hybritech's inventors 
did not conceive the claimed invention before May 1980." ld. 
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In Hybritech, the CAFC had the ability to correct the lower 
court's findings of fact because those findings were clearly 
erroneous. Had the district court found reasons to support its 
conclusion that the graphs and data in Hybritech's notebooks did 
not establish an early conception date, rather than summarily 
rejecting the evidence,98 the outcome at the appellate level might 
have been different. An appellate court cannot overturn findings 
" 'simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the 
case differently .... [I]f the district court's account of the 
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety' 
or 'where there are two permissible views of the evidence' " then 
the findings are not clearly erroneous.99 Thus, a trial's outcome 
is dependent upon a court's ability to understand scientific 
intricacies sufficiently to support its holding. As the issues become 
more complex, the trial results can become more erratic. 
Inconsistent rulings regarding inventors' intellectual property 
rights can decrease incentives to invent, which is contrary to the 
purpose of the Patent Act. 
Even when a court has a good grasp of the scientific questions 
presented, it still must view the situation "through the eyes of 
the person of ordinary skill in the art."lOO Because the person of 
ordinary skill in advanced scientific fields is highly educated and 
comes to the courtroom with considerable background knowledge, 
the court must determine what this person knows to make either 
a novelty or nonobviousness determination.lol This determination 
can lead to courts giving legal meaning to subtle scientific 
distinctions. 
For example, the Hybritech courts had to determine whether 
the person of ordinary skill would have known that appropriate 
monoclonal antibodies would have affinity constants greater than 
108 liters/mole. Hybritech's patent application for the monoclonal 
antibody - sandwich assay combination had been rejected twice 
by the Patent Examiner for being obvious.102 After Hybritech 
98. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1349. 
99. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1375 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 
564 (1985)). 
100. Kay ton, ::w.pra note 28, at 25. 
101. ]d. For instance, information relating to facts in a well-used chemistry textbook 
might be reasonably presumed known by the person of ordinary skill in the field of 
chemistry. See id. 
102. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1350. In light of references that disclosed the use of 
monoclonal antibodies in a competitive immunoassay and the use of polyclonal antibodies 
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amended its application to limit its claims to the use of monoclonal 
antibodies with at least a 108 liters/mole binding affinity to the 
antigen,103 the Examiner granted the patent.104 
Because none of the prior art references mentioned a lOS liter! 
mole baseline for an affinity constant, the CAFC found that the 
combination of all the references did not suggest the claimed 
invention as a whole.lo5 Therefore, the CAFC found the claimed 
invention nonobvious.lo6 However, the CAFC could have found 
just as readily that the person of ordinary skill in the art at the 
time of the invention would have recognized from background 
knowledge that high affinity antibodies would be necessary for 
a workable assay; the exact numerical baseline is fairly triviaJ.107 
This subtle difference may have cost MAB over two-and-a-quarter 
million dollars. 
B. Secondary Considerations 
Perhaps to avoid the pitfalls of trying to ascertain what 
background knowledge the person of ordinary skill in the field 
possesses, the CAFC uses secondary considerations as signposts 
in sandwich assays, the Examiner stated that "it would be obvious to use the monoclonal 
antibody for the polyclonal antibodies in the conventional immunoassay protocols defined 
by the instant claims." Id. 
103. As the affinity constant increases, the attraction between the antibody and the 
antigen increases and these species tend to bind more selectively to each other. Thus, 
the sensitivity of the antibody to the antigen increases. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1369. 
104. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1350. Thus, the amended application read: 
In an immunometric assay to determine the presence or concentration of an 
antigenic substance in a sample of a fluid comprising forming a ternary 
complex of a first labelled antibody, said antigenic substance, and a second 
antibody said second antibody being bound to a solid carrier insoluble in 
said fluid wherein the presence of the antigenic substance in the samples is 
determined by measuring either the amount of labelled antibody bound to 
the solid carrier or the amount of unreacted labelled antibody, the improt'e· 
ment comprising employing monoclonal antibodies having an affinity for the 
antigenic substance of at least about 10' liters/mole for each of said labelled 
antibody and said antibody bound to a solid carrier. 
Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1370 (emphasis added by the court). 
105. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380-81. 
106. Id. at 1381. 
107. "The affinity constant for the reaction is probably the single most important 
overall parameter of the reaction since it determines the sensitivity of detection of the 
antigen." Otterness & Darugh, Principles oj AntiIJody Reactions, in ANTmODY AS A TOOL 
98 (J. Marchalonis & G. Warr ed. 1982). "The higher the value of [the affinity constant). 
the more suitable the antiserum [antibody] will be in terms of sensitivity and precision." 
J. RANSOM, PRACTICAL COMPETITIVE BINDING ASSAY METHODS 71 (1976). Suitable binding 
constants are in the range of 10' to 10'0 moleslliter for radioimmunoassay tests. /d. 
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to denote when an invention is nonobvious.108 However, in a 
rapidly expanding scientific field, there are very few signposts. 
When innovations occur rapidly, a later product's monetary success 
could be due to the underlying inventions rather than the claimed 
invention itself.lo9 Secondary considerations such as long felt need 
and failure of others become meaningless when changes are rapid. 
However, unexpected or surprising results, failure of others to 
successfully develop the invention, simultaneous solutions by 
different inventors, and copying, when present, may be evidence 
of the nonobviousness of the invention even in rapidly expanding 
fields.110 
In addressing secondary considerations, the CAFC in Hybritech 
attributed the kits' monetary success to Hybritech's patented 
invention rather than the underlying pioneer discovery of a 
method to produce large quantities of monoclonal antibodies. 
Noting a three-year span between the availability of monoclonal 
antibodies and the marketing of Hybritech's kit, the court 
concluded that three years time sufficiently separated these 
events in the "fast-moving biotechnology field" so that the success 
could be attributed to Hybritech's kits alone.l11 The CAFC ignored 
evidence that production of the appropriate monoclonal antibody 
and development of feasible ways to attach it to a solid surface 
were time consuming. As the district court explained: 
While the idea was a simple one, putting it into practice was 
time consuming, and expensive, because of the steps neces-
sary to produce the monoclonals for commercial diagnostic 
purposes. There are a number of complex steps to be gone 
through before such kit would be available. Suitable screening 
assays must be developed to select the best antibody-produc-
ing clones from perhaps hundreds of thousands of them. The 
sheer work and time involved in "cell forming" is also con sid-
erable.1l2 
108. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
109. Because the time between innovations is short, it is difficult to determine if the 
financial success of a succeeding innovation is due to the improvements claimed by the 
invention or due to previous inventions; the nexus between the financial success and the 
claimed invention may be difficult to prove. See Merges, supra note 43. 
110. Although there was evidence of simultaneous development of similar kits during 
the time that Hybritech developed its kits, the CAFC chose not to address the probative 
value of this evidence, which would tend to negate nonobviousness, "because the other 
evidence of nonobviousnessJwasl adequate." Hyltritech, 802 F.2d at 1380 n.4. 
111. Hybr'itech, 802 F.2d at 1382. 
112. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1348. 
19
Severson: Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.:  Are Courts Promo
Published by Reading Room, 1989
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 658 1988-1989
658 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VoI.5:639 
The CAFC also considered evidence that Hybritech's kits 
"unexpectedly solved longstanding problems."113 Citing testimony 
showing that Hybritech's immunoassay was more accurate, less 
prone to producing false positive results, and faster, the CAFC 
found that Hybritech's invention exhibited unexpected 
advantages.1l4 Although the evidence showed that Hybritech's 
kits performed better than some of its competitors, the greater 
specificity of monoclonal antibodies, and thus their accuracy, may 
not have been unexpected. Some of the references that the CAFC 
found not to be prior art might nonetheless indicate the general 
expectations prevalent in the field at the time that Hybritech 
was developing its kits.ll5 Prior to Hybritech's filing date, scientists 
predicted that because "large quantities of monospecific antibodies 
can be produced, the emergence of simple and reliable assay 
procedures far surpassing current [radioimmunoassay] techniques 
in sensitivity, precision, speed, specificity, convenience and overall 
reliability is within sight."116 Thus, it could be argued that 
Hybritech's assays, rather than "unexpectedly solv[ing] 
longstanding problems" as determined by the CAFC, performed 
as expected in the industry. 
The problems discussed in this section, though not unique to 
this type of patent, are exacerbated in Hybritech because 
biotechnological methods in immunology comprise a complex and 
rapidly changing field. The unfamiliarity of the court with the 
technology complicates not only the determination of the level of 
ordinary knowledge and skill in the field but also the application 
of secondary considerations. 
Because the complexity makes it difficult for a court to view 
the patent through the eyes of the person of ordinary skill in 
the art and to establish what meaning, if any, should attach to 
secondary considerations, the crucial determination of 
nonobviousness can become unprincipled. On one hand, if an 
invention really is "obvious" but a patent nonetheless is held 
valid, the public loses the ability to use information for seventeen 
years that was already in the public domain without any new 
113. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1382. 
114. fa. at 1382-83. 
115. For instance, six months prior to Hybritech's filing for its patent, a medical journal 
predicted that U[t]he specificity and uniformity of monoclonal antibodies should markedly 
improve diagnostic accuracy." Baumgarten, Viral fmmunodiagnosis, 53 YALE J. MED. 71 
(1980). 
116. Ekins, MQTe Sensitive fmmunoassays, 284 NATURE 14, 15 (1980). 
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compensating disclosure from the inventor. On the other hand, a 
court advantaged with hindsight could easily find an invention 
that was truly "nonobvious" to be "obvious." This finding could 
have the effect of discouraging invention or encouraging inventors 
to keep their innovations secret. Neither of these effects is 
consistent with the constitutional purpose underlying the Patent 
Act. 
c. The Graham Inquiries 
Because secondary considerations are likely to become more 
unreliable when the invention springs from a rapidly expanding 
scientific field,1l7 the three Graham inquiries may become more 
important.118 Both the Supreme Court and the CAFC use these 
inquiries as the foundation of their nonobviousness determinations, 
but their paths diverge in the interpretation of these findings. 
In short, the Supreme Court looks for a synergistic or surprising 
result to find patentability.ll9 By contrast, the CAFC recognizes 
the sometimes slow and painful progress of science and demands 
only that the prior art not explicitly suggest the claimed 
invention.120 
The CAFC, in evaluating Hybritech's claims, considered all the 
elements, including the 108 liters/mole affinity limitation and 
found that the combination of them was not suggested by the 
prior art.12l According to the CAFC, the district court 
impermissibly determined whether the "gist" or idea of the 
invention-sandwich assays using monoclonal antibodies-was 
117. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text. 
118. Graham v. John Deere Co •• 383 U.S. 1. 17 (1965). See supra text accompanying 
notes 34-35. 
119. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47. A guide to the CAFC's interpretation 
of S 103 is found in Hodosh v. Block Drug Co.;o786 F.2d 1136 (1986): 
[O)bviousness determination[s) generally include the following tenets of pat-
ent law that must be adhered to when applying S 103: (1) the claimed 
invention must be considered as a whole (though the difference between 
claimed invention and prior art may seem slight. it may also have been the 
key to advancement of the art); (2) the references must be considered as a 
whole and suggest the desirability and thus the obviousness of making the 
combination; (3) the references must be viewed without the benefit of hind-
sight vision afforded by the claimed invention; (4) "ought to be tried" is not 
the standard with which obviousness is determined; and (5) the presumption 
of validity remains constant and intact throughout litigation. 
!d. at 1143 n.5. 
121. HylJriteeh. 802 F.2d at 1380-81. 
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disclosed by the prior art.122 The district court's finding that the 
invention was "obvious and logical"123 in light of prior teachings 
was, therefore, flawed because the court had failed to properly 
consider the 108 liters/mole affinity limitation.124 Furthermore, the 
CAFC viewed as irrelevant references that "establish that it 
would have been obvious to try monoclonal antibodies of 108 liters! 
mole affinity in a sandwich immunoassay that detects the presence 
of or quantitates antigen."125 The prior art, all references taken 
together, must explicitly suggest the entire invention. 
The CAFC's adherence to the explicit suggestion test gives 
creative attorneys the leeway to search the relevant art to find 
a limitation to patent claims which, though "obvious" in the 
nonlegal sense to those skilled in the art, is not explicitly discussed 
in the literature. This limitation could then be used to render 
the invention nonobvious. 
The 108 liters/mole affinity constant limitation could fit this 
category.126 Although in a technical sense, the limitation to 
antibodies that have a binding strength to the antigen of greater 
than 108 liters/mole was not explicitly present in the prior art, 
it may have been in the mind of the ordinary person skilled in 
the art.127 
The result in Hybritech prohibits any other company from 
producing monoclonal sandwich assay kits using monoclonals that 
have an affinity greater than 108 liters/mole without paying a 
royalty to Hybritech; this prohibition includes, for all practicable 
purposes, all usable monoclonal antibodies.128 If the affinity 
constant limitation was known, in a practical sense, to those 
working in the field, patent protection for Hybritech's invention 
would violate the goals of the Patent Act because information 
would be taken from the public domain without any corresponding 
new advancement to technology. 
122. Id. at 1380. 
123. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1353. 
124. Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1381. 
125. Id. at 1380. 
126. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
127. The ability of an antibody to bind selectively to a particular antigen correlates 
positively with the affinity constant. See supra note 107. There is an affinity limit, 
therefore, below which an antibody would not be expected to bind that antigen selectively; 
an antibody below this limit would not be effective in a diagnostic test for the presence 
of that antigen. Nonspecific associative reactions could occur leading to errors in analyses 
using these lower affinity monoclonal antibodies. See J. RANSOM supra note 107, at 44. 
128. See supra note 62. 
22
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 5
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol5/iss2/5
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 661 1988-1989
1989] PROMOTING PROGRESS 661 
D. Possible Remedies 
The technical complexity and rapid advances in a scientific 
field like biotechnology can promote arbitrary patenting decisions. 
The question arises whether other methods of protecting 
intellectual property more adequately fulfill the constitutional 
mandate of promoting science and the useful arts in rapidly 
expanding scientific fields. 
In Hybritech, the general idea of using monoclonal antibodies 
in sandwich assays probably was recognized by many workers in 
the immunology field shortly after the technique of hybridomas 
was perfected.129 However, a practical application of this idea 
required expertise and time, both of which can be translated into 
moneypQ The Patent Act fostered a horserace to "invent" and 
reduce to practice a sandwich assay; the winner earned a patent 
that entitled it to a seventeen-year limited monopoly on the 
resulting product. 
This winner-take-all philosophy may be inappropriate for the 
production of biotechnological products.l3l Because development 
and production of these products are expensive and possibly 
duplicitous, the potential for wasted resources is tremendous. 
For instance, in Hybritech, at least five other research groups 
developed sandwich monoclonal assays; however, this concurrent 
research was not disclosed until after the filing date of Hybritech's 
patent application.l32 Thus, even though at least six groups 
invested time and money to "select the best antibody-producing 
clones from perhaps hundreds of thousands"133 of potential clones, 
only one was eligible for patent protection. 
There are similarities between the patenting problems found 
in bioengineered products and in semiconductor chip products. 
Transistors, resistors, and capacitors are expensive to designl34 
and easy to copy.135 However, most improvements to chips are 
129. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
130. See supra text accompanying note 112. 
131. The CAFC hypothesized that the district court in Hy'f:ri.tech adhered to this 
philosophy. See supra note 63. 
132. Hybritech. 623 F. Supp. at 1354; Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1380 n.4. 
133. Hybritech, 623 F. Supp. at 1348. 
134. The design of a chip can "take the innovating chip firm years, consume thousands 
of hours of engineer and technician time, and cost millions of dollars. The development 
costs for a single new chip can reach $100 million." H.R. Rep. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5750, 5751. 
135. "In several months, for a cost of less than $50,000, a pirate fum can duplicate the 
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obvious and thereby unpatentable;136 furthermore, trade secret 
laws are of no value once the chip is sold.137 
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984138 was the 
legislative solution to the semiconductor chip dilemma. The Act 
creates a sui generis form of intellectual property; it combines 
both patent and copyright law with some new concepts. Following 
registration, the Act gives the owner of a design the exclusive 
right "to reproduce the mask work, to import or distribute a 
semiconductor chip product" embodying the mask work, and to 
license others to do the same.139 
The Congressional goal of the Act was to provide "particular 
protection for the costly and time-consuming process of designing 
the circuitry of semiconductor chips. By according such protection, 
Congress sought to provide a continuous economic incentive for 
research and improvement of chip technology through an orderly 
mode of constructive rivalry."14o Thus, the inventor is given an 
incentive to risk time and capital on the invention of a new, but 
obvious, semiconductor chip. Furthermore, as long as a mask 
work is created independently, it does not infringe another's 
work.141 
A similar system for registering an inventor's rights to 
bioengineered products might better promote scientific progress 
in the biotechnology field than the current patenting scheme.142 
mask work of an innovator." Samuelson, Creating a Nw Kind of Intellectual Property: 
Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 491 
(1985). 
136. See id. at 503. 
137. Once the semiconductor chip is marketed, competitors can discover how to make 
the chip by reverse engineering. 
138. 17 U.S.C. SS 901-14 (Supp. v 1987). 
139. 17 U.S.C. S 905 (Supp. v 1987). "'[A] mask work fixed in a semiconductor chip 
product' ... is . . • how the [Semiconductor Chip Protection Act] defines the set of 
sheets embodying the many individual layer images etched into the semiconductor chip." 
Rasking & Stern, Introduction to the Symposium on the Semiconductor Chip Protection 
Act of 1984 and Its Lessons, 70 MINN. L. REV. 263, 264 (1985) (quoting 17 U.S.C. S 902(a)(1) 
(Supp. IT 1984)). 
140. Rasking & Stern, supra note 139, at 264. 
141. The standard of originality in copyright law "means only that the work owes its 
origin to the author, i.e., is independently created, and not copied from other works." 1 
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHT S 2.01[A], at 2-8 (1988). The Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act intended its "originality" requirement to be similar to that of copyright 
law. See H.R. Rep. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5750, 5768. 
142. Some also argue that a sui generis intellectual property right should also be 
created for computer programs. See Samuelson, supra note 135, at 507. 
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Because only registration of an independently created 
bioengineered product would be required, a court or the patent 
office would no longer have to determine the date of conception 
of an invention or whether the invention is obvious in light of 
prior art. Thus, judicial interpretation of complex scientific issues 
would be minimized. Furthermore, interpretation of conflicting 
judicial standards and ambiguities regarding secondary 
considerations would be moot. Following the Semiconductor Chip 
Act's example, independently created inventions that are similar 
could both be protected; however, pirated works would be 
disallowed. 
Factors mitigating against the creation of a sui generis form 
of protection for bioengineered products or processes include 
difficulties in the administration and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights as the number and kind of rights increase. In 
particular, because the terms "bioengineered products" or 
"bioengineering process" are not as clearly defined as the term 
"semiconductor chips," courts would need to make the technically 
difficult decision whether an invention was protected. These 
difficulties would be magnified if the sui generis approach were 
followed for a variety of other inventions, such as superconduction 
materials, produced from advances in complex, rapidly changing 
scientific fields. 
CONCLUSION 
Inventions that are spawned in rapidly expanding scientific 
fields tend to be distinguished by their technical complexity and 
expense. Because these inventions incorporate ideas on the cutting 
edge of science, there is a real danger that courts presented with 
patent cases will misconstrue the scientific questions presented. 
A court is obligated to make findings of fact based on the Graham 
criteria; this process entails determining what the ordinary person 
skilled in a highly technical field knows and how that knowledge 
differs from the claimed patent. Furthermore, because innovations 
occur rapidly in a scientific revolution, a court's reliance on 
secondary considerations such as long-felt need, failure of others, 
or monetary success of the product may be misplaced. Time may 
be too brief to effectively evaluate long-felt need and failure of 
others, while monetary success could be due to other underlying 
innovations rather than the invention. 
A court put in this difficult position must also grapple with 
conflicting patentability standards promulgated by the Supreme 
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Court and the CAFC. A district court must choose between 
following the standards of the Supreme Court or the CAFC; the 
choice to follow the standards of one will most likely lead to 
reversal by the other. 
The conflict over the appropriate application of the patentability 
standards promotes a more subjective approach to patentability 
decisions. The uncertainty created by this subjective approach 
could result in unjustified monopolistic protection for "obvious" 
inventions. Also, a strict interpretation of the patentability hurdles 
could inhibit inventors from inventing or investors from 
underwriting the products. Both of these results violate the 
constitutional mandate of the Patent Act. 
Although a possible solution for at least some of the inventions 
arising from scientific revolutions might lie with sui generis 
protection similar to that afforded by the Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act, multiplicity of different kinds of intellectual 
property rights, with their own peculiar standards, could muddy 
the waters even further. There are no easy answers for the 
problems presented in this Comment. However, because scientists 
working in complex scientific fields will continue to invent, all 
involved with patent law should carefully consider and address 
the unique problems raised by these inventions. 
Mary L. Severson 
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